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Abstract
Approval-like voting rules, such as Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval vot-
ing (SP-AV), the Bucklin rule (an adaptive variant of k-Approval voting), and the
Fallback rule (an adaptive variant of SP-AV) have many desirable properties: for ex-
ample, they are easy to understand and encourage the candidates to choose electoral
platforms that have a broad appeal. In this paper, we investigate both classic and pa-
rameterized computational complexity of electoral campaign management under such
rules. We focus on two methods that can be used to promote a given candidate: ask-
ing voters to move this candidate upwards in their preference order or asking them to
change the number of candidates they approve of. We show that finding an optimal
campaign management strategy of the first type is easy for both Bucklin and Fallback.
In contrast, the second method is computationally hard even if the degree to which we
need to affect the votes is small. Nevertheless, we identify a large class of scenarios that
admit fixed-parameter tractable algorithms.
1 Introduction
Approval voting—a voting rule that asks each voter to report which candidates she approves
of and outputs the candidates with the largest number of approvals—is one of the very few
election systems that have a real chance of replacing Plurality voting in political elections.
It has many attractive theoretical properties, and its practical usefulness is supported by
the experimental results of Laslier and Van der Straeten [33] and Van der Straeten et
al. [12]. Some professional organizations, such as, e.g., the Mathematical Association of
America (MAA), Institute for Operations Research and Management Sciences (INFORMS),
or Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), employ Approval voting to select
their leaders. One of the major attractions of Approval voting is that, in contrast to the
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more standard Plurality voting, under Approval voting the candidates can benefit from
running their campaigns in a consensus-building fashion, i.e., by choosing a platform that
appeals to a large number of voters.
Nonetheless, Approval voting has certain disadvantages as well. Perhaps the most sig-
nificant of them is its limited expressivity. Indeed, even a voter that approves of several
candidates may like some of them more than others; however, Approval voting does not al-
low her to express this. Therefore, it is desirable to have a voting rule that operates similarly
to Approval, yet takes voters’ preference orders into account.
Several such voting rules have been proposed. For instance, the Bucklin rule (also known
as the majoritarian compromise) asks the voters to gradually increase the number of can-
didates they approve of, until some candidate is approved by a majority of the voters. The
winners are the candidates that receive the largest number of approvals at this point. In
a simplified version of this rule, which is popular in the computational social choice litera-
ture [41, 40, 18], the winners are all candidates that are approved by a majority of the voters
in the last round. Under both variants of the Bucklin rule, the common approval threshold is
lowered gradually, thus reflecting the voters’ preferences. However, this common threshold
may move past an individual voter’s personal approval threshold, forcing this voter to grant
approval to a candidate that she does not approve of. To alleviate this problem, Brams and
Sanver [7] have recently introduced a new election system, which they call Fallback voting.
This system works similarly to the Bucklin rule, but allows each voter to only approve of a
limited number of candidates; its simplified version can be defined similarly to the simplified
Bucklin voting.
With variants of Approval voting gaining wider acceptance, it becomes important to
understand whether various activities associated with running an approval-based electoral
campaign are computationally tractable. Such activities can be roughly classified into be-
nign, such as winner determination, and malicious, such as manipulation and control; an
ideal voting rule admits polynomial-time algorithms for the benign activities, but not for the
malicious ones. However, there is an election-related activity that defies such classification,
namely, bribery, or campaign management [23, 17, 16, 4, 9]. Both of these terms are used
for actions that aim to make a given candidate an election winner by means of spending
money on individual voters so as to change their preference rankings; these actions can be
benign if the money is spent on legitimate activities, such as advertising, or malicious, if
the voters are paid to vote non-truthfully.
Now, winner determination for all approval-based rules listed above is clearly easy, and
the complexity of manipulation and especially control under such rules is well understood
[31, 3, 19, 20, 25, 28]. Thus, in this paper we focus on algorithmic aspects of electoral
campaign management. Following Elkind, Faliszewski, and Slinko [17] and Elkind and Fal-
iszewski [16] (see also [13, 9]) who study this problem for a variety of preference-based voting
rules, we model the campaign management setting using the framework of shift bribery. Un-
der this framework, each voter v is associated with a cost function pi, which indicates, for
each k > 0, how much it would cost to convince v to promote the target candidate p by k
positions in her vote. The briber (campaign manager) wants to make p a winner by spending
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as little as possible. This framework can be used to model a wide variety of campaign man-
agement activities, ranging from one-on-one meetings to phone-a-thons to direct mailing,
each of which has a per-voter cost that may vary from one voter to another.
Note, however, that in the context of approval-based voting rules, we can campaign in
favor of a candidate p even without changing the preference order of any voter. Specifically,
if some voter v ranks p in position k and currently approves of k− 1 candidates, we can try
to convince v to lower her approval threshold so that she approves of p as well. Similarly, we
can try to convince a voter to be more stringent and withdraw her approval from her least
preferred approved candidate; this may be useful if that candidate is p’s direct competitor.
Arguably, a voter may be more willing to change her approval threshold than to alter her
ranking of the candidates. Therefore, such campaign management tactics may be within
the campaign manager’s budget, even when she cannot afford the more direct approach
discussed in the previous paragraph. We will refer to this campaign management technique
as “support bribery”; a variant of this model has been considered by Elkind, Faliszewski,
and Slinko [17] (a similar, but somewhat different, variant of this model was studied by
Baumeister et al. [4]).
In this paper, we investigate both campaign management activities discussed above,
i.e., shift bribery and support bribery, from the algorithmic perspective. We consider five
approval-based voting rules, namely, SP-AV (as formalized by Brams and Sanver [6]), Buck-
lin (both classic and simplified), and Fallback (both classic and simplified). We show that
shift bribery is easy with respect to both variants of the Bucklin rule, as well as both vari-
ants of the Fallback rule. The argument for the simplified version of both rules relies on
dynamic programming, while for the classic version of these rules we use a more involved
flow-based approach. In contrast, support bribery tends to be hard; this holds even if we
parameterize this problem by the number of voters to be bribed or the total change in the
approval counts, and use very simple bribery cost functions. Nevertheless, we identify a nat-
ural class of bribery cost functions for which support bribery is fixed-parameter tractable
(FPT) with respect to the latter parameter. Interestingly, some of our hardness results hold
even for the case of single-peaked profiles, where one often—though certainly not always—
expects tractability [38, 11, 27, 8, 26]. On the other hand, some of the problems considered
in this paper do become easy when the input election can be assumed to be single-peaked:
in particular, we describe a good (FPT) approximation algorithm for support bribery under
SP-AV for the single-peaked domain.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we formally define
our model of elections and the voting systems we study, as well as provide the necessary
background on (parameterized) computational complexity. We then present our algorithms
for shift bribery (Section 3), followed by hardness results (classic and parameterized) and
FPT algorithms for support bribery (Section 4). Section 5 contains our results on support
bribery for single-peaked elections. We conclude the paper by presenting directions for future
research.
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2 Preliminaries
An election is a pair E = (C, V ), where C = {c1, . . . , cm} is the set of candidates and
V = (v1, . . . , vn) is the list of voters. Each voter vi is associated with a preference order i,
which is a total order over C, and an approval count `i ∈ [0, |C|]; voter vi is said to approve
of the top `i candidates in her preference order. We denote by rank(c, v) the position of
candidate c in the preference order of voter v: v’s most preferred candidate has rank 1 and
her least preferred candidate has rank |C|. A voting rule is a mapping that given an election
E = (C, V ) outputs a set W ⊆ C of election winners.
We say that an election (C, V ) is single-peaked if there is an order . of the candidates
(called the societal axis) such that each voter’s preference order i satisfies the following
condition: for every triple of candidates (a, b, c), if a . b . c or c . b . a, then a i b
implies b i c. Equivalently, an election is single-peaked if there is an order . over the set of
candidates such that for each prefix of each vote, the set of candidates included in this prefix
forms an interval with respect to .. Given an election, it is easy to verify if it is single-peaked
and, if so, to compute one of the societal axes for it in polynomial time [2, 22]. (Interestingly,
deciding if a profile is in some sense close to being single-peaked is typically an NP-hard
task [21, 10], unless we know the axis with respect to which we measure the closeness [26]).
Intuitively, the notion of single-peakedness captures scenarios where the electorate is focused
on a single one-dimensional issue such as, e.g., the left-to-right political spectrum or the
military spending.
Voting Rules We now describe the voting rules that will be considered in this paper.
In what follows, we denote the number of voters by n. Under k-Approval each candidate
gets one point from each voter that ranks her in top k positions. The k-Approval score
sk(c) of a candidate c ∈ C is the total number of points that she gets, and the winners
are the candidates with the highest score. The Bucklin rule, which can be thought of as an
adaptive version of k-Approval, is defined as follows. Given a candidate c ∈ C, let sB(c)
denote the smallest value of k such that at least bn2 c+1 voters rank c in the top k positions;
we say that c wins in round sB(c). The quantity kB = minc∈C sB(c) is called the Bucklin
winning round. Observe that no candidate wins in any of the rounds ` < kB and at least
one candidate wins in round kB. The Bucklin winners are the candidates with the highest
kB-Approval score. Under the simplified Bucklin rule, the winners are the candidates whose
kB-Approval score is at least bn2 c + 1; all Bucklin winners are simplified Bucklin winners,
but the converse is not necessarily true.
We observe that k-Approval, despite its name, ignores the approval counts entirely: a
candidate c may fail to get a point from a voter vi who approves of her (if `i ≥ rank(c, vi) >
k), or obtain a point from a voter vj who does not approve of her (if `j < rank(c, vj) ≤ k).
Similarly, neither version of the Bucklin rule uses the information provided by the approval
counts. In contrast, the SP-AV rule [6] relies heavily on the approval counts: we define a
candidate’s approval score to be the number of voters that approve of her, and the winners
under SP-AV are the candidates with the highest approval score. Finally, Fallback voting
[7] makes use of both the preference orders and the approval counts. Specifically, under
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this rule we apply the Bucklin rule to the election obtained by deleting each voter’s non-
approved candidates from her preference ranking. Since the preference orders are truncated,
it may happen that no candidate is ranked by more than half of the voters, in which case
the candidates with the highest approval score are elected. We can replace the Bucklin rule
with the simplified Bucklin rule in this construction; we will refer to the resulting rule as
the simplified Fallback rule.
Parameterized Complexity The framework of parameterized complexity deals with
computationally hard problems. In a parameterized problem, each input instance I includes
an integer k called the parameter, and the aim is to design algorithms that are efficient if the
value of the parameter is small. Formally, a problem is said to be fixed-parameter tractable
(FPT) with respect to parameter k if it admits an algorithm whose running time on input
(I, k) is f(k)|I|O(1) for some computable function f , where |I| is the description size of I;
note that the exponent of |I| does not depend on k. Though f is typically an exponential
function, such an algorithm is usually more efficient than, for example, one that runs in
time Θ(|I|k).
Parameterized complexity also has a hardness theory, which relies on parameterized
reductions. Given two parameterized problems Q and Q′, we say that Q reduces to Q′
if there is an FPT-computable function f such that for each input (x, k) it holds that
(x, k) ∈ Q if and only if f(x, k) = (x′, k′) ∈ Q′ and, moreover, k′ = g(k) for some function
g. That is, the parameter of the transformed instance only depends on the parameter of the
original instance. We call f a parameterized reduction from Q to Q′.
An analog of the class NP in the parameterized hierarchy is W[1]: a parameterized
problem is in W[1] if it admits a parameterized reduction to the problem of deciding whether
a given Turing machine accepts a given input word in at most k steps. The class W[2] is the
next class in the parameterized hierarchy, and we have FPT ⊆ W[1] ⊆ W[2]. A problem is
said to be W[1]-hard (respectively, W[2]-hard), if all problems in W[1] (respectively, W[2])
can be reduced to it by a parameterized reduction. It is conjectured that FPT 6= W[1]. Just
as NP-hardness of a problem indicates that this problem is unlikely to be polynomial-time
solvable, a W[1]-hardness (or, worse yet, W[2]-hardness) result means that the problem
(with the given parameterization) is unlikely to admit an FPT algorithm.
To prove W[1]-hardness (or W[2]-hardness) of a parameterized problem Q, it suffices
to show a parameterized reduction from some parameterized problem already known to
be W[1]-hard (respectively, W[2]-hard). In our hardness proofs, we will use the W[1]-hard
multicolored clique problem [29] and the W[2]-hard dominating set problem [14].
Definition 1. In the multicolored clique problem we are given a graph G = (V, E), an
integer k, and a partition of the vertex set V into k independent sets V1, . . . ,Vk. We ask if
G contains a k-clique. We take k to be the parameter.
Definition 2. In the dominating set problem we are given a graph G and a positive
integer k. We ask if G has a dominating set of size at most k, that is, if there exists a subset
S of G’s vertices such that (a) |S| ≤ k, and (b) each vertex not in S has a neighbor in S.
We take k to be the parameter.
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For a more extensive treatment of parameterized complexity, we refer the reader to the
several excellent textbooks on this subject [14, 36, 30].
Campaign Management The following definition is adapted from the work of Elkind
and Faliszewski [16], which builds on the ideas of Elkind, Faliszewski, and Slinko [17].
Definition 3. Let R be a voting rule. An instance of R-shift bribery problem is a tuple
I = (C, V,Π, p), where C = {p, c1, . . . , cm−1} is a set of candidates, V = (v1, . . . , vn) is a
list of voters together with their preference orders over C (and approval counts, if R uses
them), Π = (pi1, . . . , pin) is a family of cost functions, where each pii is a non-decreasing
function from [0, |C|] to Z+∪{+∞} that satisfies pii(0) = 0 (each function pii is specified by
listing its values at 0, . . . , |C|), and p ∈ C is a designated candidate. The goal is to find a
vector t = (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ (Z+)n with the following properties: (a) if for each i = 1, . . . , n we
shift p upwards in the i-th vote by ti positions, then p becomes an R-winner of the resulting
election, and (b) for all s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ (Z+)n that satisfy condition (a) it holds that∑n
i=1 pi
i(ti) ≤
∑n
i=1 pi
i(si). We set opt(I) =
∑n
i=1 pi
i(ti).
In words, pii(k) is the cost of shifting the preferred candidate p upwards by k positions
in the preferences of the i-th voter. We will refer to the vector t = (t1, . . . , tn) as a shift
action or simply a (shift) bribery, and denote by shf (C, V, t) (or by shf (E, t)) the election
obtained from E = (C, V ) by shifting p upwards by ti positions in the i-th vote, for each
i = 1, . . . , n. If rank(p, vi) = k, but a shift action prescribes shifting p by k′ ≥ k positions
in vi, we simply place p on top of vi. Also, we write Π(t) =
∑n
i=1 pi
i(ti) to denote the cost
of a shift action t.
We say that a shift action t = (t1, . . . , tn) is minimal for I, if Π(t) = opt(I), p is a winner
in shf (C, V, t), but for every shift action s 6= t such that si ≤ ti for all i = 1, . . . , n it holds
that p is not a winner in shf (C, V, s). Note that an optimal shift action is not necessarily
minimal, as it may include some shifts of cost zero that are not needed to make p a winner.
Shift bribery does not change the voters’ approval counts. A more general notion of
bribery, which is relevant for SP-AV and (simplified) Fallback voting, was proposed by
Elkind, Faliszewski, and Slinko [17] in the technical report version of their paper. Specifi-
cally, they defined mixed bribery for SP-AV, where the briber can both shift the preferred
candidate and change the voters’ approval counts. In this work, we find it more convenient
to separate these two types of bribery. Thus, we will now define support bribery, which
focuses on changing the number of approved candidates.
To define support bribery, we need to be able to specify the costs of increasing/decreasing
approval counts for the voters. Formally, we assume that each voter vi has a support bribery
cost function σi : Z → Z+ ∪ {+∞}, which satisfies (a) σi(0) = 0, and (b) for each k > 0 it
holds that σi(k) ≤ σi(k+1) and σi(−k) ≤ σi(−k−1). For a given k ∈ Z, we interpret σi(k)
as the cost of convincing vi to approve of `i + k candidates. Clearly, it suffices to define σi
on [−`i, |C| − `i], where `i is the approval count of vi.
Definition 4. Let R be a voting rule. An instance of R-support bribery problem is a
tuple I = (C, V,Σ, p), where C = {p, c1, . . . , cm−1} is a set of candidates, V = (v1, . . . , vn)
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is a list of voters, where each voter vi is represented by her preference order i and her
approval count `i, and Σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) is a family of support bribery cost functions (each
function σi is represented by listing its values on [−`i, |C| − `i]). The goal is to find a
vector t = (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ Zn with the following properties: (a) if for each i = 1, . . . , n voter
vi changes her approval count from `i to `i + ti, then p is an R-winner of the resulting
election, and (b) for all s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ Zn that satisfy condition (a) it holds that∑n
i=1 σ
i(ti) ≤
∑n
i=1 σ
i(si). We set opt(I) =
∑n
i=1 σ
i(ti).
We refer to the vector t = (t1, . . . , tn) as a push action or a (support) bribery. We
denote by psh(C, V, t) (or by psh(E, t)) the election obtained from election E = (C, V )
by setting, for each i, the approval count of the i-th voter to be `i + ti. If `
i + ti < 0 or
`i + ti > m, then we set the approval count of the i-th voter to be 0 or m, respectively. We
set Σ(t) =
∑n
i=1 σ
i(ti).
We say that a push action t = (t1, . . . , tn) is minimal for I if Σ(t) = opt(I), p is a
winner in psh(C, V, t), and for every push action s 6= t such that 0 ≤ si ≤ ti or ti ≤ si ≤ 0
for all i = 1, . . . , n it holds that p is not a winner in psh(C, V, s). Note that, as in the case
of shift bribery, an optimal push action is not necessarily minimal because it may perform
unnecessary zero-cost pushes.
We also consider two natural special types of support bribery cost functions. We say
that a support bribery cost function σ is positive if σ(k) = +∞ for each k < 0, and we
say that it is negative if σ(k) = +∞ for each k > 0. The support bribery problem with
positive cost functions corresponds to the setting where the campaign manager can only
increase the voters’ approval counts, and can be viewed as a fine-grained version of control
by adding voters; similarly, the support bribery with negative cost functions can be viewed
as a refinement of control by deleting voters (see the survey of Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra,
and Hemaspaandra [24] for a discussion of the complexity of election control and for further
references).
To conclude this section, we observe that we have defined shift bribery and support
bribery as function problems. However, when talking about NP-completeness, we consider
the decision variants of these problems, where we ask if there exists a successful bribery
whose total cost does not exceed a given value b—the bribery budget.
3 Shift Bribery
In this section, we present our results for shift bribery under the Bucklin rule and the
Fallback rule. We start by describing our algorithm for the simplified version of the Bucklin
rule; this algorithm can be modified to work for the simplified version of the Fallback rule.
Theorem 5. Simplified Bucklin-shift bribery is in P.
Proof. Given an instance I = (C, V,Π, p) of Simplified Bucklin-shift bribery, let m = |C|,
n = |V |, and let k be the Bucklin winning round for (C, V ). Let W ⊆ C be the set of the
simplified Bucklin winners in (C, V ). We can assume that p 6∈W .
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Let t = (t1, . . . , tn) be a minimal optimal shift action for I. Let ` be the Bucklin winning
round in shf (C, V, t). We claim that ` ∈ {k, k + 1}. Indeed, any shift action moves every
candidate in W by at most one position downwards in each vote. Therefore, in shf (C, V, t)
all candidates in W win in round k + 1, and hence ` ≤ k + 1. Now, suppose that ` < k. In
(C, V ) the `-Approval score of every candidate is at most bn2 c, so the only candidate that
can win in round ` in shf (C, V, t) is p, and for that she has to be moved into position `
in some voters’ preferences. However, moving p into position k in those voters’ preferences
suffices to make p a winner in round k (and thus an election winner), and we have assumed
that t is minimal. This contradiction shows that ` ≥ k. Hence, to find an optimal shift
bribery, it suffices to (a) compute a minimum-cost shift action that makes p a winner in
round k, (b) compute a minimum-cost shift action that makes p a winner in round k + 1
and ensures that no other candidate wins in round k, and (c) output the cheaper of the
two.
To win in round k, p needs to obtain bn2 c+1−sk(p) additional k-Approval points. Thus,
to find a minimum-cost shift bribery that makes p win in round k, we consider all votes in
which p is not ranked in the top k positions, order them by the cost of moving p into the
k-th position (from lowest to highest), and pick the first bn2 c+ 1− sk(p) of these votes. Let
s denote the shift action that moves p into position k in each of those votes.
Computing a shift action that ensures p’s victory in the (k + 1)-st round is somewhat
more difficult. In this case we need to ensure that (a) each candidate in W is demoted
from position k to position k+ 1 enough times that it does not win in round k, and (b) p’s
(k+1)-Approval score is at least bn2 c+1. Thus, we need to find an optimal balance between
bribing several groups of voters.
For each c ∈ C \ {p}, let Vc denote the set of all voters that rank c in the k-th position
and rank p below c; note that c 6= c′ implies Vc∩Vc′ = ∅. Let us fix a candidate c in C \{p}.
The only way to ensure that c does not win in round k is to shift p into position k in at
least n(c) = max{0, sk(c)−bn2 c} votes in Vc. Note that n(c) > 0 if and only if c ∈W . Thus,
if for some c ∈ W we have |Vc| < n(c), there is no way to ensure that c does not win in
round k, so in this case we output s and stop.
Otherwise, we proceed as follows. Let Ac be the set of all voters in Vc that rank p in
position k + 1, and let Bc = Vc \Ac. Note that for each vote in Ac, shifting p into the k-th
position does not change the (k + 1)-Approval score of p, while doing the same for a vote
in Bc increases the (k+ 1)-Approval score of p by one. For each i = 0, . . . , |Bc|, let b(c, i) be
the minimum cost of a shift action that (a) shifts p into position k + 1 or above in i votes
from Bc, and (b) shifts p into position k in at least n(c) votes from Ac ∪Bc.
We can compute the numbers b(c, i) for all c ∈ C \ {p} and all i = 0, . . . , |Bc| using
dynamic programming, as follows. Fix a candidate c ∈ C \ {p}. Reorder the voters so that
the voters in Bc appear first, ordered according to their cost of moving p into the (k+ 1)-st
position (from lowest to highest), followed by the voters in Ac, ordered according to their
cost of moving p into the k-th position (from lowest to highest). After this step the j-th
voter in Bc is v
j . For each i and j, 0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ |Bc|, and each h = 0, . . . , n(c), we define
b(c, i, j, h) to be the cost of a minimum-cost shift action that only involves the voters in Ac
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and the first j voters in Bc and that (a) shifts p into position k+ 1 or above in i votes from
Bc, and (b) shifts p into position k in at least h votes from Ac ∪Bc. If there is no such shift
action, we set b(c, i, j, h) = +∞.
We can compute b(c, 0, j, h) for all j = 0, . . . , |Bc| and all h = 0, . . . , n(c) by bribing the
first h voters in Ac to shift p into position k. Similarly, we can compute b(c, i, j, 0) for all
0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ |Bc| by bribing the first i voters in Bc to shift p into position k+ 1. For all the
remaining cases, we compute b(c, i, j, h) using the following formula:
b(c, i, j, h) = min

b(c, i− 1, j − 1, h) + pij(rank(p, vj)− (k + 1)),
b(c, i− 1, j − 1, h− 1) + pij(rank(p, vj)− k),
b(c, i, j − 1, h).
(1)
The first two lines of this formula correspond to the cases where the j-th voter in Bc is
bribed to shift candidate p into positions k + 1 and k, respectively. The third line deals
with the case where this voter is not bribed. It is immediate that this method correctly
computes the desired values. By definition, we have b(c, i) = b(c, i, |Bc|, n(c)). For each
candidate c ∈ C \ {p} and each i = 0, . . . , |Bc|, we define r(c, i) to be the shift action
corresponding to the value b(c, i); this shift action can be extracted from the dynamic
programming computation of b(c, i) using standard techniques.
Let Vp = V \
⋃
c∈C\p Vc; the set Vp consists of all voters who rank p in top k positions. Note
that in any minimal shift action, voters in Vp are not bribed. Now, for every j = 1, . . . ,m−1
and every i = 0, . . . , bn2 c + 1 − sk+1(p), let β(j, i) be the minimum cost of a shift action
that (i) only involves voters in ∪j`=1Vcj , (ii) ensures that candidates c1, . . . , cj do not win
in round k and (iii) ensures that p’s (k + 1)-Approval score is at least sk+1(p) + i; we
set β(j, i) = +∞ if no such shift action exists. The numbers β(j, i), j = 1, . . . ,m − 1,
i = 0, . . . , bn2 c + 1 − sk+1(p), can be computed by dynamic programming as follows. We
have
β(1, i) =
{
b(c1, i) for i = 0, . . . , n(c1),
+∞ for i = n(c1) + 1, . . . , bn2 c+ 1− sk+1(p).
Further, for every j > 1 and all i = 0, . . . , bn2 c+ 1− sk+1(p) we have
β(j, i) = min {β(j − 1, i− `) + b(cj , `) | ` = 0, . . . ,min(i, n(cj))} .
By construction, β(m− 1, bn2 c+ 1− sk+1(p)) is the minimum cost of a shift action ensuring
that p wins in round k+1 and no other candidate wins in round k. A shift action r that has
this cost can be extracted from the dynamic programming computation of β(m−1, bn2 c+1−
sk+1(p)); it is the sum of shift actions {r(cj , ij)}cj∈C\p for appropriate values of i1, . . . , im−1.
We output the cheaper of s and r. This algorithm clearly runs in polynomial time, and
our argument shows that it produces an optimal shift action for I.
Theorem 6. Simplified Fallback-shift bribery is in P.
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Proof. Given an instance I = (C, V,Π, p) of Simplified Fallback-shift bribery, let m = |C|
and n = |V |. Further, let i be the preference order of voter vi, and let `i be her approval
count. Set L = maxi=1,...,n `
i.
Our algorithm proceeds in two stages. First, it computes a shift action s of minimum cost
that (after deleting the non-approved candidates from each voter’s preference list) ensures
that there is no winner according to the simplified Bucklin rule and that no candidate has
more approvals in total than the preferred candidate p. Second, for each ` = 1, . . . , L it
computes a shift action r` of minimum cost ensuring that p wins under simplified Bucklin
in round ` (that is, the Bucklin winning round is `, and p is an `-Approval winner). Finally,
we output the cheapest among s and r`, ` = 1, . . . , L.
In what follows, we say that p can exclude c from round ` in a vote vi if c i p and
rank(c, v) = min(`i, `). We say that p can exclude c from approval if c i p and rank(c, v) =
`i.
To obtain s, it suffices to find, for each t = 1, . . . , bn/2c, a minimum-cost shift action st
ensuring that p receives t approvals, and everybody else receives at most t approvals. This
can be done greedily, as follows. For each candidate c ∈ C \ {p}, let Vc be the set of votes
where p can exclude c from approval. For each c ∈ C \ {p} with s(c) > t, we order the votes
in Vc according to their cost pi
i(rank(p, vi) − rank(c, vi)), and bribe the cheapest s(c) − t
voters in Vc (if |Vc| < s(c)− t for some such c, then st remains undefined). If after this stage
p has t′ < t approvals, we bribe the cheapest t − t′ voters in ⋃C\{p} Vc that have not been
bribed yet (again, if the number of such voters is less than t−t′, then st remains undefined).
We then set s to be the cheapest among s1, . . . , sbn/2c (where the cost of an undefined shift
action is taken to be +∞).
The computation of r1 is easy: we just have to make sure that p receives at least bn/2c+1
points in the first round, so we can sort the voters according to the cost of shifting p into
the top position (from lowest to highest), and bribe the first bn/2c + 1 − s1(p) voters. To
compute r` for ` = 2, . . . , L, we employ the algorithm used for computing the shift action
r in the proof of Theorem 5, with a few modifications. Specifically, for each c ∈ C \ {p}
we let Vc contain the votes in which p can exclude c from round ` − 1. We partition Vc
into Ac and Bc by setting Ac = {vi ∈ Vc | rank(c, vi) = ` − 1, rank(p, vi) = ` ≤ `i} and
Bc = Vc \ Ac. For i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . ,m we say that position j in vote vi is `-good if
j ≤ min(`i, `). We then proceed as in the proof of Theorem 5: to determine r`, we compute
for each i = 0, . . . , |Bc| a minimum-cost shift action that shifts p into an `-good position
in i votes from Bc and excludes c from round ` − 1 in at least s`−1(c) − bn/2c votes from
Ac ∪Bc, and then use dynamic programming to decide how many voters from each set Vc,
c ∈ C \ {p}, we want to bribe.
Shift bribery also admits a polynomial-time algorithm for the regular version of the
Bucklin rule; however, the proof becomes more involved.
Theorem 7. Bucklin-shift bribery is in P.
Proof. Let m = |C|, n = |V |, and let k be the Bucklin winning round for (C, V ). Let W
denote the set of Bucklin winners in (C, V ).
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Let t = (t1, . . . , tn) be a minimal optimal shift action for I, and let ` be the Bucklin
winning round in shf (C, V, t). We have ` ∈ {k − 1, k, k + 1}. Indeed, the argument in the
proof of Theorem 5 shows that ` ≤ k + 1. Now, suppose that ` < k − 1. This means that
in shf (C, V, t) our preferred candidate p wins in round `. Consider the set of all voters that
were requested to shift p into position ` or higher under t; this set must be non-empty since
prior to the bribery p did not win in round `. If we now demote p into position k − 1 in
those votes, she would still win in round k − 1. Moreover, since no other candidate wins in
round k − 1 in the original election, p is now the unique winner in round k − 1 and hence
the Bucklin winner, a contradiction with t being a minimal optimal shift action.
We will now find (a) a minimum-cost shift action that makes p a winner in round k− 1,
(b) a minimum-cost shift action that makes p a winner in round k and ensures that no
candidate has a higher k-Approval score than p, and (c) a minimum-cost shift action that
makes p a winner in round k + 1 and ensures that no other candidate wins in round k or
has a higher (k+ 1)-Approval score than p. We will then output the cheapest of these three
shift actions.
The first step is straightforward: we order all voters that do not rank p in the first k− 1
positions by the cost of shifting p into position k − 1 in their votes (from the lowest to the
highest), and bribe the first bn2 c+ 1− sk−1(p) of them to move p into position k− 1 in their
votes. Denote this shift action by s.
The second step is somewhat more difficult. Namely, for each i = bn2 c+ 1, . . . , n, let ri
be a minimum-cost shift action that ensures that p’s k-Approval score is at least i, and the
k-Approval score of any other candidate is at most i. We can compute ri as follows.
Recall that W is the set of Bucklin winners in election (C, V ). For each candidate c ∈W ,
let Vc denote the set of all voters that rank c in the k-th position and rank p below c. To
ensure that c’s k-Approval score is at most i, we need to shift p into position k in at least
sk(c) − i such votes. Thus if for some c ∈ W we have |Vc| < sk(c) − i then we record that
for this value of i the shift action ri is undefined and we set its cost to +∞. Otherwise,
we order the votes in each Vc by the cost of moving p into the k-th position in this vote
(from lowest to highest), and bribe the first sk(c) − i voters in each set to move p in the
k-th position in their votes; denote the corresponding shift action by ri,1. In the resulting
election shf (C, V, ri,1), no candidate other than p gets more than i k-Approval points. Let
s′k be p’s k-Approval score in shf (C, V, r
i,1). If s′k ≥ i, we set ri = ri,1. Otherwise, we order
the voters that rank p in position k+1 or lower in shf (C, V, ri,1) by the cost of moving p into
position k in their preferences (from lowest to highest), and bribe the first i − s′k of them
to move p into position k in their votes. Denote this bribery by ri,2, and set ri = ri,1 + ri,2.
Finally, let r be the cheapest shift action among rb
n
2
c+1, . . . , rn.
Now, finding a minimum-cost shift action that makes p win in round k + 1 and ensures
that no other candidate wins in an earlier round or has more (k+1)-Approval points than p
is yet more difficult. Indeed, we must balance the need to demote the candidates that may
win in round k against the need to demote the candidates that may beat p in round k + 1.
Note also that we may need to shift p into position k in some votes in order to lower the
k-Approval score of its competitors.
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We deal with these issues by reducing our problem to that of finding a minimum-cost
circulation. Recall that an instance of a minimum-cost circulation problem is given by a
directed graph G = (V, E), and, for each (v, w) ∈ E , a lower bound l(v, w) on the flow from
v to w, an upper bound u(v, w) on the flow from v to w and the cost c(v, w) of a unit of
flow from v to w. A solution is a feasible flow, i.e., a vector (f(v, w))(v,w)∈E that satisfies (a)
l(v, w) ≤ f(v, w) ≤ u(v, w) for all (v, w) ∈ E and (b) ∑(z,v)∈E f(z, v) = ∑(v,w)∈E f(v, w) for
any v ∈ V. The cost of a feasible solution is given by∑
(v,w)∈E
c(v, w)f(v, w).
An optimal solution is one that minimizes the cost among all feasible solutions. It is well-
known that when all costs and capacities are integers, an optimal circulation is integer and
can be found in polynomial time (see, e.g., [15, 37]).
Given an instance of our problem, we construct a family of instances of minimum-cost
circulation, one for each i = max{0, bn2 c + 1 − sk+1(p)}, . . . , n as follows (see Figure 1).
For each i, our graph Gi models the situation where we bribe exactly i voters ranking p in
position k + 2 or lower. We let Gi consist of six “layers”. The first layer consists of a single
vertex S, and the second layer consists of a single vertex S′. In the third layer, we have a
vertex Uh for each candidate ch ∈ C \{p}. In the fourth layer, we have a vertex Wj for each
j = 1, . . . , n. In the fifth layer, we have a vertex Zh for each candidate ch ∈ C \ {p}. The
sixth layer consists of a vertex T .
S S′
U1
Uµ
W1
Wi
Wj
Wn
Z1
Zµ
T
Figure 1: Graph Gi. For readability, we set µ = m−1. The bold arcs are unconstrained, the
dashed arcs have a lower bound on the size of the flow, and the regular arcs can carry at
most one unit of flow. The graph corresponds to an instance where the voters’ preferences
are such that rank(p, v1) = rank(c1, v
i) = rank(cm−1, vj) = rank(cm−1, vn) = k + 1, and
moreover, rank(cm−1, v1) = rank(cm−1, vi) = rank(c1, vj) = rank(c1, vn) = k.
The costs and capacities of the arcs depend on the value of i. We will now describe
them layer-by-layer. In our description, we will say that an arc (v, w) is unconstrained if it
satisfies l(v, w) = 0, u(v, w) = +∞, and c(v, w) = 0.
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There is an arc (S, S′) with l(S, S′) = u(S, S′) = i and c(S, S′) = 0. Also, for each
ch ∈ C \ {p}, there is an arc from S′ to Uh with l(S′, Uh) = max{0, sk+1(ch)− sk+1(p)− i},
u(S′, Uh) = +∞, c(S′, Uh) = 0.
Each vertex Wj , j = 1, . . . , n, in the fourth layer has one incoming arc if v
j ranks p
in position k + 1 or lower, and no incoming arcs otherwise. Specifically, if vj ranks some
ch ∈ C \ {p} in position k + 1, and ranks p in position k + 2 or lower, then the graph
contains an arc (Uh,Wj) with l(Uh,Wj) = 0, u(Uh,Wj) = 1. We set c(Uh,Wj) to be equal
to the cost of shifting p into position k+ 1 in vj . If vj ranks p in position k+ 1, there is an
unconstrained arc from S to Wj .
There are two types of arcs leaving the vertices in the fourth layer. First, for each
j = 1, . . . , n, there is an unconstrained arc (Wj , T ). Second, there is an arc (Wj , Zh) if
and only if vj ranks candidate p in position k + 1 or lower, and ch is ranked in position
k. We set l(Wj , Zh) = 0, u(Wj , Zh) = 1, and let c(Wj , Zh) to be equal to the cost of
shifting p from position k + 1 into position k in the preferences of the j-th voter, i.e.,
c(Wj , Zh) = pi
j(rank(p, vj)− k)− pij(rank(p, vj)− (k + 1)).
For each vertex Zh in the fifth layer, there is an arc from this vertex to T that satis-
fies l(Zh, T ) = max{0, sk(ch) − bn2 c}, u(Zh, T ) = +∞, c(Zh, T ) = 0. Finally, there is an
unconstrained arc (T, S).
In this construction, the flow value on the arc (T, S) corresponds to the number of
voters bribed. Specifically, the flow from S to S′ reflects the number of voters that rank p
in position k+ 2 or lower that were bribed to shift p into position k+ 1 or higher, while the
flow going directly from S to the vertices in the fourth layer reflects the number of voters
that ranked p in position k + 1 and were bribed to shift p into position k. Now, sending x
units of flow from S′ to Uh corresponds to shifting p into the (k + 1)-st position in x votes
that rank ch in the (k + 1)-st position. The lower bound on the flow ensures that we bribe
at least sk+1(ch)− sk+1(p)− i such voters to move p in position k+ 1 or higher, and hence
after the bribery ch’s (k + 1)-Approval score is at most sk+1(p) + i. Note that if we bribe
exactly i voters that do not rank p in the top k + 1 positions to shift p into position k + 1
or higher, p’s (k+ 1)-Approval score becomes exactly sk+1(p) + i, so these arcs ensure that
no candidate has a higher (k + 1)-Approval score than p.
The arcs between the third and the fourth layer ensure that such a bribery can actually
be implemented (i.e., for each ch ∈ C \ {p}, there are sufficiently many voters that rank ch
in the (k+ 1)-st position and rank p below ch); their cost reflects the cost of moving p into
position k + 1 in the preferences of the bribed voters.
The flow leaving the fourth layer and going directly into T corresponds to the voters
bribed to shift p into position k + 1 only, while the flow between the fourth and the fifth
layer corresponds to the voters that were bribed to move p into position k. The cost of the
arcs between the fourth and the fifth layer corresponds to the cost of shifting from position
k + 1 to position k; note that the cost of shifting p into position k + 1 in that vote has
already been accounted for.
The arcs between the fifth and the sixth layer ensure that no candidate wins in round
k: the flow of size t from Zh to T signifies that t voters that rank ch in position k have
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been bribed to move p into position k (and therefore demote ch into position k + 1). Thus,
by satisfying all flow constraints, we ensure that the k-Approval score of each candidate in
C \ {p} is at most bn2 c.
The argument above shows that each valid circulation in Gi, i = max{0, bn2 c + 1 −
sk+1(p)}, . . . , n, corresponds to a successful shift bribery in which exactly i voters that rank
p in position k+2 or lower were bribed to shift p into position k+1 or higher, and the cost of
the circulation is equal to the cost of this bribery. Moreover, the corresponding shift action
can be easily computed given the circulation. Clearly, the converse is also true: if there is a
successful shift action of cost X that bribes exactly i voters that rank p in position k + 2
or lower, there is also a valid circulation of size i that has the same cost.
For each i = max{0, bn2 c + 1 − sk+1(p)}, . . . , n, let qi denote the shift action that cor-
responds to an optimal circulation in Gi if one exists; if there is no valid circulation in Gi,
we leave qi undefined and set its cost to +∞. Now, let q be a minimum-cost shift action
among qi; if all qi are undefined, q remains undefined as well, and its cost is set to +∞.
By construction, q is a minimum-cost shift action that makes p a winner in the (k + 1)-st
round and ensures that no candidate wins in the k-th round or has more (k + 1)-Approval
points than p.
Finally, consider the shift actions s, r, and q, and output one with the minimum cost.
This algorithm runs in polynomial time, and outputs a minimum-cost shift action that
makes p a winner.
A similar approach works for the Fallback rule.
Theorem 8. Fallback-shift bribery is in P.
Proof. The proof is very similar to that of Theorem 7. We use essentially the same algorithm,
but make the following modification. As in the proof of Theorem 6, we compute the cost of a
shift bribery that ensures that no candidate is approved by more than half of the voters and
our candidate p wins by approval count (if such a shift bribery exists). Then, we apply the
algorithm from Theorem 7, taking into account that under Fallback voting it is sometimes
possible to ensure that some candidate c becomes disapproved after p is shifted into her
position. Modifying the algorithm from Theorem 7 to take advantage of this possibility is
straightforward, and we omit a detailed argument.
4 Support Bribery
In the technical report version of their work, Elkind et al. [17] prove an NP-completeness
result for mixed bribery under SP-AV. Their proof does not rely on shifting the preferred
candidate in the voters’ preferences, and therefore applies to support bribery as well, showing
that the decision version of SP-AV-support bribery is NP-complete. In this section we
extend this result to Fallback voting, and explore the parameterized complexity of support
bribery under both the simplified and the classic variant of this rule.
Each instance I of support bribery can be associated with the following parameters.
First, let α(I) denote the maximum number of bribed voters over all minimal briberies that
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solve I optimally. Second, let β(I) and β′(I) denote, respectively, the maximum and the
minimum of
∑n
i=1 |ti| over all minimal briberies (t1, . . . , tn) that solve I optimally; these
parameters describe the total change in the approval counts. Observe that β(I) ≥ β′(I) and
β(I) ≥ α(I) for every instance I.
We will now demonstrate that support bribery under Fallback voting is computationally
hard, even in very special cases. These results, while somewhat disappointing from the
campaign management perspective, are hardly surprising. Indeed, we have argued that
support bribery can be viewed as a fine-grained version of control by adding/deleting voters,
and both of these control problems are NP-hard for Fallback voting [19]. In fact, since
Fallback voting defaults to Approval voting if no candidate is approved by a majority of
voters, by introducing appropriate dummy candidates and voters we can easily reduce the
problem of control by adding voters under Approval to the problem of support bribery
under Fallback voting.
Our next result shows that support bribery is NP-hard for both simplified Fallback
voting and regular Fallback voting, even under very strong restrictions on the cost function;
moreover, these problems remain intractable even for instances with a small value of α.
Thus, bribing even a few voters can be a hard task.
Theorem 9. Both Fallback-support bribery and simplified Fallback-support bribery
are NP-complete, and also W[2]-hard with respect to parameter α (the maximum number of
voters to be bribed), even in the special case where each cost is either +∞ or 0, and either
all cost functions are positive or all cost functions are negative.
Proof. For both types of cost functions (all-positive and all-negative), we give a polynomial-
time computable parameterized reduction from the W[2]-hard dominating set problem;
the reductions are inspired by those given by Erde´lyi et al. [19] in their proof of W[2]-
hardness of control by adding/deleting voters in Fallback voting.
We start by considering negative cost functions. Let G = (V, E) and k be the given
input for dominating set. We assume V = {v1, . . . , vn} and we write N [vi] to denote the
closed neighborhood of vertex vi in G. We then construct an election E as follows. Our
set of candidates is V ∪ {a, b, p} ∪D, where p is the preferred candidate and D is a set of
dummy candidates. We do not specify the set of the dummy candidates explicitly; rather,
we require that it is large enough that each of the dummies is approved by at most one voter.
It will become clear in the course of the proof that choosing a polynomial-size set D with
this property is possible. There are 6n voters, and each of them approves n+ 3 candidates.
Specifically, for each vi ∈ V, we construct two voters, xi and x¯i, and we construct additional
4n votes in order to adjust the scores of the candidates for our purposes. The preferences
of the voters are shown below. We use dots to denote dummies, and we use sets in the lists
when their elements can be ordered arbitrarily. The sign | indicates the approval count;
non-approved candidates are not listed.
voter xi: a  N [vi]  . . .  p  b |
voter x¯i: a  V \N [vi]  . . .  p  b |
2n+ 1 voters: V  . . .  b |
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n+ k voters: a  . . .  p  b |
1 voter: . . .  p  b |
n− k − 2 voters: . . .  b |
The cost of decreasing the approval count arbitrarily is 0 for each of the votes in X =
{x1, . . . , xn}, and is +∞ for all other votes; our budget is 0. Note that in election E we
have s1(a) = 3n+ k, sn+1(vi) = 3n+ 1 for each i, sn+2(p) = 3n+ k + 1, and sn+3(b) = 6n.
Let t be some minimal successful bribery for I. Note that applying t must decrease a’s
first-round score by at least k; otherwise a would be the unique winner of election psh(E, t)
under (simplified) Fallback. Thus, applying t sets the approval count to 0 in at least k votes
in X. This decreases p’s score in round n+ 2 by at least k points as well, so p can have at
most 3n+1 points in round n+2 in psh(E, t). On the other hand, in round n+3 candidate
b will have more approvals than p under any bribery of cost 0, so p can become a winner
only if it wins in round n+2. Therefore, p’s score in round n+2 must remain at least 3n+1
in psh(E, t), which means that t must set the approval count to 0 in exactly k votes from
X. Let S be the set of these votes, and let {s1, . . . , sk} be the corresponding vertices of G.
As only voters in X can be bribed within the budget and t is a minimal successful bribery,
it follows that voters not in S are not bribed. Consequently, we have α(I) = k.
Now, observe that no matter how S is chosen, a does not win in the first n+1 rounds in
psh(E, t), and p gets a strict majority of votes in round n+2. Therefore, p wins in psh(E, t)
if and only if none of the candidates in V gets 3n+ 1 points in round n+ 1. This happens
if and only if each vertex loses at least one point as a result of the push action t, meaning
that the sets N [s1], . . . , N [sk] cover V. Since this occurs if and only if the vertices s1, . . . , sk
form a dominating set, we have proved the correctness of the reduction.
We will now consider positive cost functions. Again, the reduction is from dominating
set. Let G = (V, E) and k be the input instance; we use the notation defined above.
Assume without loss of generality that k ≥ 2. We construct an election E with candidate
set V ∪ {a, b, p}, where p is the preferred candidate. The set of voters is of size 2n + 2,
including a voter xi for each vi ∈ V. Preferences and approval counts are shown below; we
omit the non-approved candidates in the last n+ 2 votes.
voter xi with 0 approvals: | V \N [vi]  b  p  a  N [vi]
k voters with 1 approval: a |
1 voter with n approvals: V |
n+ 1− k voters with n+ 3 approvals: a  b  p  V |
The cost of increasing the approval count arbitrarily is 0 in any of the votes in X =
{x1, . . . , xn}, and is +∞ in all other votes; our budget is 0. Observe that in E we have
s1(a) = n + 1, s2(b) = n + 1 − k, s3(p) = n + 1 − k, and sn+3(vi) = n + 2 − k for each i.
Thus, no candidate has strict majority (that is, n + 2 points) in any round, so the winner
is candidate a, who has the largest number of approvals.
Let t be some minimal successful push action for I. Observe that since we can only
increase the approval counts, s1(a) is n + 1 in psh(E, t) as well. Hence, applying t must
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increase p’s score by at least k in order for p to beat a in some round. To achieve this, t
must increase the approval count in at least k votes in X. On the other hand, suppose that
we bribe more than k voters in X to approve p. Then b gets at least n + 2 points in some
round of the resulting election; let j be the first such round. As all voters prefer b to p, it
cannot be the case that p gets n + 2 points in round j, so this bribery is not successful.
Hence, applying t must increase p’s approval count by exactly k, via bribing a subset of
voters S ⊆ X of size k. Note that this implies α(I) = k as well. Let S = {s1, . . . , sk}.
Now, looking at the scores of the candidates in V, one can see that a support bribery
that bribes voters in S to increase p’s score is successful if and only if each vi ∈ V receives
at most k− 1 additional points from the voters in S. This holds if and only if each vertex is
missing from at least one of the sets V \N [s1], . . . ,V \N [sk]. This is equivalent to s1, . . . , sk
being a dominating set. Thus, the proof is complete.
Since the hardness result of Theorem 9 for Fallback-support bribery holds even if all
bribery costs are either 0 or +∞, it follows that this problem does not admit an approxi-
mation algorithm with a bounded approximation ratio.
Theorem 9 shows that Fallback-support bribery is W[2]-hard with respect to the
parameter α. Given that we have β(I) ≥ α(I) for each instance I, it is natural to ask
whether Fallback-support bribery remains hard if even β is small, i.e., every minimal
optimal bribery only makes small changes to the approval counts. In Section 5, we will
see that even a very restricted version of this problem remains hard. More precisely, in
Theorem 11 we will prove that support bribery for each of SP-AV, simplified Fallback
voting, and Fallback voting remains NP-hard and also W[1]-hard with respect to parameter
β, even for single-peaked electorates and unit costs, i.e., when σi(k) = |k| for each k and
each i = 1, . . . , n.
However, the hardness proof in Theorem 11 (see Section 5) heavily relies on the fact that
unit cost functions allow us to increase approval counts in some of the votes while decreasing
them in some other votes. In contrast, we will now prove that if all cost functions are positive
or all cost functions are negative, (simplified) Fallback-support bribery is fixed-parameter
tractable with respect to β′ (and hence also with respect to β).
Theorem 10. support bribery for SP-AV, simplified Fallback voting, and Fallback voting
is FPT with respect to parameter β′ (the minimum total change in approval counts over all
optimal briberies), as long as either all bribery cost functions are positive or all bribery cost
functions are negative.
Proof. Suppose we are given an instance I = (C, V,Σ, p) of support bribery with |V | = n.
It will be convenient to assume that we also given β′ = β′(I); if this is not the case, we
can try each possible value of β′ in an increasing fashion. We will present an algorithm that
works for both the simplified and the classic variant of Fallback voting; the algorithm can
easily be modified (indeed, simplified) for SP-AV.
Under the Fallback rule, a candidate can win by either (a) having the highest number
of approvals in the Bucklin winning round or (b) having the highest number of approvals
when there is no Bucklin winning round; for simplified Fallback rule, condition (a) changes
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to (a′) obtaining a majority of approvals in the Bucklin winning round. To take into account
briberies that ensure p’s victory via case (b), we view this case as an “extra round” in which
the candidates with the highest number of approvals win. This way we can treat all cases in
a uniform manner (it will be clear how to handle minor differences hidden by this notation).
A bribery t = (t1, . . . , tn) with
∑n
i=1 |ti| ≤ β′ has the following two properties, which
will be used by our algorithms:
(1) t can change the approval scores of at most β′ candidates, and
(2) t can change the approval score of each candidate by at most β′.
If t makes p win in round ` of the election psh(C, V, t) while changing its approval score by
δ(p), then we say that t is an (`, δ(p))-bribery ; here ` may also refer to the extra round. As
argued above, we can restrict ourselves to (`, δ(p))-briberies with 0 ≤ δ(p) ≤ β′.
Negative cost functions. Suppose first that each cost function is negative; in this case any
bribery can only decrease a candidate’s score.
We use a bounded search tree approach. By “guessing” an answer to a question, we
always mean branching in the search tree according to all the possible ways of answering
this question. Our algorithm will branch at most f(β′) = β′ + 2 times, and in each case
it will branch into at most g(β′) = 3β′+1 directions. Moreover, our algorithm will make at
most a linear number of steps until reaching a leaf of the search tree. This ensures that
its running time can be bounded by O(g(k)f(k)|I|) = 3O(β′2)|I|, and hence our problem is
fixed-parameter tractable with respect to β′.
We first make some observations regarding our input instance. If p is approved by at
most bn/2c voters in (C, V ), then its only chance to win in psh(C, V, t) is to have the highest
number of approvals in the extra round. On the other hand, suppose that p is approved
by at least bn/2c + 1 voters in (C, V ). Let `0 be the earliest round in which p receives
bn/2c+ 1 approvals, let `1, . . . , `q denote the subsequent rounds where p receives additional
approval points, and let `q+1 denote the extra round; naturally, `0 < `1 < · · · < `q ≤ `q+1.
Now, suppose that there is a bribery t that makes p a winner in psh(C, V, t). If t does
not decrease the number of approvals that p has, then p wins in round `0 in psh(C, V, t).
However, t may bribe some of the voters who approve p in order to prevent some other
candidate(s) from winning in an earlier round. If this happens, p wins in some round `q′
with q′ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , q, q + 1}. We will now argue that q′ ≤ β′.
To see why this is the case, suppose that under t we bribe x voters who approve p and
rank her in top `0 positions and y voters who approve p and rank her in position `1 or lower;
note that x+ y ≤ β′. Let L = {`i1 , . . . , `ir} ⊆ {`1, . . . , `q} be the list of rounds such that for
each ` ∈ L it holds that p receives one or more approval points in round ` in (C, V ), but not
in psh(C, V, t) (i.e., in t all voters who approve p and rank it in position ` are bribed not
to approve p). By construction, we have |L| ≤ y. Renumber the elements of {`1, . . . , `q} \L
as `j1 , . . . , `js . In psh(C, V, t) candidate p has at least bn/2c+ 1− x approvals in round `0,
and it gains at least one approval point in each of the rounds `j1 , . . . , `js , so it is approved
by a strict majority of voters in round `jx . Since |L| ≤ y, we have jx ≤ x+ y ≤ β′. Hence,
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if p is approved by at least bn/2c+ 1 voters in (C, V ) and t is a successful bribery, then p
wins in psh(C, V, t) in one of the rounds `0, . . . , `q′ , where q
′ = min{β′, q + 1}.
We now describe our algorithm. First, the algorithm guesses the round ` in which p
wins in psh(C, V, t) and the number δ(p) of approvals that p loses until this round; in other
words, we guess (`, δ(p)) for which t is an (`, δ(p))-bribery. By our previous observations,
there are β′ + 1 choices of ` and β′ + 1 choices of δ(p).
The algorithm then computes the set of candidates that have to lose at least one point
as a result of t (this computation depends on whether we consider classic or simplified
Fallback voting). Let R be the set that consists of these candidates as well as candidate p;
we say that the candidates in R are relevant. By Observation (1), if I is solvable and we
guessed ` and δ(p) correctly, the set R contains at most β′ + 1 candidates. The algorithm
also computes integers δ`−1(c) and δ`(c) for each c ∈ R \ {p} such that:
(3) an (`, δ(p))-bribery makes p a winner if and only if each candidate c ∈ R \ {p} loses
at least δ`−1(c) points until round `− 1, and at least δ`(c) points until round `.
The procedure for computing these integers depends on whether we consider classic or
simplified Fallback voting. In particular, we always have δ`−1(c) ≤ δ`(c) and under simplified
Fallback voting we have δ`−1(c) = δ`(c). We set δ`−1(c) = 0 if ` = 1.
Next, the algorithm partitions the set {(v, t) | v ∈ V, 1 ≤ t ≤ β′} into equivalence
classes. By applying a pair (vi, t) we mean bribing voter vi to decrease her approval count
from `i to `i − t. We say that (v, t) and (v′, t′) are equivalent if for each cr ∈ R it holds
that applying (v, t) has the same effect on cr as applying (v
′, t′). More formally, (v, t) and
(v′, t′) are equivalent if for each cr ∈ R it holds that (i) (v, t) and (v′, t′) decrease the
number of approvals cr gets until round `− 1 by the same amount and (ii) (v, t) and (v′, t′)
decrease the number of approvals cr gets until round ` by the same amount. A pair (v, t)
can behave in three possible ways with respect to cr: it can leave its approval count until
round ` (and hence also its approval count until round `− 1) unchanged, it can decrease by
one its approval count in round ` (but not in earlier rounds), or it can decrease by one its
approval count until round `− 1, thereby also decreasing its approval count until round `.
Therefore, there are at most 3|R| ≤ 3β′+1 equivalence classes. Note that applying some pair
(v, t) instead of another pair that is equivalent to it does not change whether a given push
action is successful or not.
Finally, the algorithm proceeds as follows: it guesses an equivalence class, picks a cheap-
est pair (vi, t) from this class that has not been applied so far, and applies it. Clearly, in
some of the at most 3|R| branches the algorithm will choose a pair that can be extended to
an optimal bribery, if there exists one. It repeats this step until it reaches the bound β′ on
the total approval count modification; this means at most β′ branchings. By the arguments
above, a minimum-cost solution for I can be obtained by taking a minimum-cost bribery
among all the successful briberies (that is, ones that ensure p’s victory) considered.
Positive cost functions. Let us now focus on the case of positive cost functions, where each
bribery can only increase a candidate’s number of approvals.
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For each possible ` and δ(p), the algorithm tries to find a minimal (`, δ(p))-bribery t of
minimum cost that makes p a winner. This means considering at most |C|+ 1 possibilities
for `, and, by (2), at most β′+1 possibilities for δ(p). Note that under positive cost functions
a minimal successful bribery always bribes voters so that in each modified vote the approval
count is equal to the rank of p. Consequently, the number of bribed voters in a minimal
successful (`, δ(p))-bribery is δ(p), and no other candidate receives additional approvals in
round `.
Having picked ` and δ(p), the algorithm tries all possible ways of choosing a (multi)set
of positive integers {t[1], . . . , t[δ(p)]} with t[1] + · · · + t[δ(p)] = β′, corresponding to the
increase of the approval counts of the bribed voters. In other words, it guesses the non-zero
elements of t (but not their positions in t). There are at most β′δ(p) ≤ β′β′ possibilities.
Then, the algorithm computes integers δ(c), c ∈ C \ {p}, such that
(3’) an (`, δ(p))-bribery makes p a winner if and only if each candidate c ∈ C \{p} gains at
most δ(c) points until round `− 1 (and hence until round ` as well), assuming that p
does not get a majority of votes in round `−1 or earlier and gains exactly δ(p) points
until round `.
The procedure for computing δ(c) depends on whether we consider simplified or classic
Fallback voting, and is polynomial-time implementable in either case.
The next step of the algorithm uses the color-coding technique of Alon, Yuster, and
Zwick [1]. This results in a randomized algorithm with one-sided error, which produces a
correct output with probability at least 2−δ(p)β′ ; this algorithm can then be derandomized
using standard methods.
We associate a color with each bribed voter. Colors are denoted by integers between 1
and δ(p); recall that t bribes exactly δ(p) voters, and we have δ(p) ≤ β′. We construct a
coloring A : C → 2{1,...,δ(p)} by assigning each candidate c ∈ C a random subset A(c) of
colors chosen uniformly and independently. Intuitively, for a candidate c ∈ C \ {p} that
obtains additional approvals as a result of the bribery t, the set A(c) corresponds to the set
of bribed voters in psh(C, V, t) who grant an additional approval to c. For candidate p, the
set A(p) corresponds to the set of bribed voters that grant an additional approval to p until
round `−1. We say that A is valid for a candidate c ∈ C \{p} if |A(c)| ≤ δ(c); it is valid for
p if |A(p)| ≤ bn/2c − s′`−1(p), where s′`−1(p) denotes the number of approval points p gets
in the original election until round `− 1. A coloring is valid if it is valid for all candidates
in C. The concept of validity reflects the fact that we have to fulfill condition (3’).
Given a valid coloring of the candidates A, the algorithm computes the set of admissible
colors for each voter vi ∈ V . A color x ∈ {1, . . . , δ(p)} is admissible for vi if the following
holds:
(a) rank(p, vi) = `i + t[x] and t[x] ≤ `− `i, i.e., in order to give an extra approval to p in
vi (in round ` or earlier), the approval count has to be increased by exactly t[x];
(b) if rank(p, vi) < `, then x ∈ A(p);
(c) for each candidate c with `i < rank(c, vi) < rank(p, vi), we have x ∈ A(c).
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We say that a collection vi1 , . . . , viδ(p) of voters is proper if for each x, 1 ≤ x ≤ δ(p), the
color x is admissible for voter vix .
Finally, the algorithm computes a proper collection of voters vi1 , . . . , viδ(p) that minimizes
the cost of a bribery where we bribe each voter vix to increase his approval count by t[x].
To do this, it finds a minimum-weight maximal matching in the bipartite graph where we
have the set of voters who do not approve p on one side, δ(p) colors on the other side, there
is an edge from each voter to all colors that are admissible for him, and the weight of each
edge corresponds to the cost of bribing the respective voter to shift his approval threshold
so as to approve p. Note that a matching of size δ(p) in this graph corresponds to a proper
collection of voters; if there is no such matching in the graph, then the algorithm does not
output anything.
The correctness of our algorithm is based on the following key observation: if a collection
of voters vi1 , . . . , viδ(p) is proper, then increasing the approval count of vix by t[x] for each
x = 1, . . . , δ(p) makes p a winner in round `. To see this, note that condition (3’) is satisfied
if we apply such a bribery. Indeed, condition (a) ensures that p gains the necessary δ(p)
points until round `, condition (b) together with the definition of validity for p ensures
that p does not win before round `, and condition (c) and the definition of validity for
candidates in C \ {p} that are affected by the bribery ensures that no candidate gains more
extra approvals than it is allowed to.
To complete the proof of correctness, it remains to show that if there exists an (`, δ(p))-
bribery t of cost at most B that increases the approval counts of voters vi1 , . . . , viδ(p) by
t[1], . . . , t[δ(p)], then our algorithm outputs a bribery of cost at most B with probability at
least 2−δ(p)β′ . To see this, consider the event that the candidates affected by t are colored
“as expected”, meaning that each candidate whose additional approvals under t come from
voters in the set {vix | x ∈ X} for some X ⊆ {1, . . . , δ(p)} receives the set X of colors
during the coloring process. For each such candidate this holds with probability 2−δ(p).
Since there are at most β′ candidates that receive additional approvals as a result of the
bribery t, it follows that with probability at least 2−δ(p)β′ it holds that for each x, the
color x will be admissible for voter vix . Whenever this holds, the algorithm will consider
t when searching for a cheapest proper collection of voters, and hence the output will be
a (successful) bribery of cost at most B. Consequently, the algorithm indeed produces a
correct output with probability at least 2−δ(p)β′ ≥ 2−β′2 .
Let us now analyze the running time of our algorithm. After choosing `, δ(p), and the
integers t[1], . . . , t[δ(p)], the coloring process and the computation of admissible colors for
each of the voters can be implemented in linear time. A minimum-weight matching can be
identified in polynomial time by, e.g., the Hungarian method [32]. The branchings in the
beginning of the algorithm contribute a factor of β′β′ |C| to the running time, yielding an
overall running time of O(β′β′ |I|O(1)).
To derandomize the algorithm, one can use (β′|C|, β′2)-universal sets [35]; the resulting
algorithm is still in FPT with respect to the parameter β′.
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5 Support Bribery for Single-Peaked Electorates
One possible way to circumvent the hardness results of Section 4 is to study the complexity
of support bribery under restricted preferences. Recent work [5, 8, 11, 27] shows that
many hard problems in computational social choice become easy if the voters’ preferences
can be assumed to be single-peaked. In the next theorem we show that this is not the case for
support bribery, as this problem remains NP-hard (and also W[1]-hard with parameter
β) even for single-peaked electorates, for each of the voting rules considered in this paper.
Theorem 11. support bribery under single-peaked preferences is NP-hard and W[1]-
hard with respect to parameter β for each of SP-AV, Fallback and simplified Fallback, even
if σi(k) = |k| for each k and each i = 1, . . . , n.
Proof. We present a parameterized reduction from the W[1]-hard multicolored clique
problem [29]; the same reduction works for SP-AV, Fallback, and simplified Fallback. Con-
sider an instance of multicolored clique given by an integer k and a graph G = (V, E)
with the vertex set V = {ν1, . . . , νN} partitioned into k independent sets V1, . . . ,Vk. With-
out loss of generality we assume that ν1 ∈ V1 and νN ∈ Vk.
We will construct an instance I of support bribery with unit costs for a single-peaked
election. We will set the budget B = 2k3 − k and ensure that an optimal bribery has cost
B if and only if G contains a k-clique, and that there always is a successful bribery of cost
at most B + 1. Since I has unit costs, this would imply B ≤ β(I) ≤ β′(I) ≤ B + 1.
We form an election (C, V ) contained in I as follows. For each i = 1, . . . , k and each
vertex νa ∈ V i, we introduce a candidate set C(νa) = {cja | 1 ≤ j ≤ k, j 6= i}, and we set
CV =
⋃
ν∈V C(ν). We then set C = CV ∪ {p, q} ∪D, where p is our preferred candidate and
D is a set of dummies (see the next paragraph).
We define a linear order C on the set of candidates as follows. The first candidate in this
order is q, the last one is p, and candidate cia precedes c
j
b if either a < b, or a = b but i < j.
The dummy candidates are placed between candidates that are adjacent in the sequence
q, c21, c
3
1, . . . , c
k−2
N , c
k−1
N , p. Specifically, we place 2B dummies between q and c
2
1, as well as
between ck−1N and p, and we place two dummies between every pair of adjacent candidates
in CV . The linear order C is illustrated below ( signs stand for the dummies).
q
2B dummies︷ ︸︸ ︷ · · · · · · 
C(ν1) plus 2(k − 2) dummies︷ ︸︸ ︷
c21   c31   · · ·   ck−11   ck1 · · · · · ·
C(νN ) plus 2(k − 2) dummies︷ ︸︸ ︷
c1N   c2N   · · ·   ck−2N   ck−1N
2B dummies︷ ︸︸ ︷ · · · · · ·  p
For each vertex νa ∈ V, we introduce a voter wa, and for each edge {νa, νb} ∈ E , we
introduce a voter w{a,b}. We let WV = {wa | νa ∈ V} and WE = {w{a,b} | {νa, νb} ∈ E}.
To define the preferences of these voters, we need additional notation. For each candidate
c and each integer i, we denote by preci(c) the i-th candidate before c in C, and we denote
by succi(c) the i-th candidate after c in C. We sometimes write succ(c) instead of succ1(c)
and prec(c) instead of prec1(c). If c precedes c′ in C, we denote by c · · · c′ the sequence
of candidates from c to c′ (inclusively) with respect to C; the same sequence in reverse is
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denoted by c′ · · · c. The preference orders and approval counts of voters wa and w{a,b}, where
νa ∈ V i, νb ∈ Vj , (νa, νb) ∈ E , and a < b, are given below (to simplify notation, we assume
i, j /∈ {1, k}; it is easy to modify the construction for the case i = 1 or j = k). In what
follows, the order of the non-approved candidates not shown in the preference lists can be
defined in any way that results in preferences that are single-peaked with respect to C.
wa: succ(c
k
a) · · · prec2k
2−5k+6(p) | cka · · · c1a  prec2k
2−5k+5(p) · · · p
w{a,b}: succ(c
j
a) · · · prec(cib)  cja  cib  prec(cja)  succ(cib) |
We will now add extra votes to ensure that each candidate c ∈ CV ∪ {q} receives L
approvals, each dummy receives fewer than L approvals, while p receives L − k approvals
in (C, V ) for some sufficiently large integer L.
To do so, we first make sure that all candidates in CV have the same number of approvals.
To this end, if some candidate c ∈ CV has fewer approvals than another candidate in CV ,
we add a vote c · · · precB(c21) | and a vote c · · · succB(ck−1N ) | to V . These two votes provide
one extra approval point to each candidate in CV \ {c} and two extra approval points to c.
Thus, by adding such pairs of votes iteratively, we can ensure that each candidate in CV
has the same score. After equalizing the scores of all candidates in CV in this manner, we
introduce |V|+ |E|+B + 1 additional pairs of such votes for each c ∈ CV ; this ensures that
at this point each dummy receives strictly fewer approvals than candidates in CV . Let the
resulting score of the candidates in CV be L; note that L > 2B + k. To obtain the required
scores for p and q, we add L− k voters approving p only and L voters with preferences of
the form q · · · succB(q) |. We denote by Vinit the set of voters added to adjust the initial
scores; we let V = WV ∪WE ∪ Vinit .
This completes the construction, which is clearly polynomial in size. Note that the total
approval score of each candidate is as required. Also, it is straightforward to check that the
preferences of all voters are single-peaked with respect to the linear order C.
It remains to show the correctness of the reduction. Note that the total number of voters
in V is at least 3L− k, while every candidate has at most L approvals. As L > k, it follows
that no candidate is approved by a strict majority of voters in (C, V ). Moreover, since
L > 2B + k = 4k3 − k, after any bribery that does not exceed the budget the score of each
candidate is at most L+B < (3L−k)/2 < b|V |/2c+1, and hence no candidate is approved
by a majority of voters after any such bribery. Thus p can be made a winner under each of
SP-AV, Fallback, and simplified Fallback if and only if p obtains the maximum number of
approvals after some bribery. Thus, from now on, when we speak of a score of a candidate or
a candidate’s number of points, we refer to this candidate’s number of approvals. To follow
our arguments, the reader may find it useful to keep Figure 2 in mind.
First, suppose that there is a minimal successful support bribery t of cost at most B.
Observe that lowering the approval counts in any of the votes q · · · succB(q) | in order to
decrease q’s score would have a cost of B + 1. Thus, t cannot decrease q’s score, and hence
it must increase p’s score by at least k points. Since p is preceded by B dummies in C, it
follows that in t the bribed voters form a subset of WV .
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q · · · · · · c1a   · · ·   cka
candidates approved by wa︷ ︸︸ ︷
  c1a+1   · · ·   ck−1N · · ·
2k2 − 5k + 5
dummies︷ ︸︸ ︷· · · · · · · · · p︸ ︷︷ ︸
candidates approved by wa when
the approval count is increased by 2k2 − 2k + 1
q · · · · · · cj−1a 
candidates approved by w{a,b}︷ ︸︸ ︷
 cja   cj+1a   · · · · · · · · ·   ci−1b  ︸ ︷︷ ︸
candidates approved by w{a,b} when
the approval count is decreased by 4
cib  ci+1b · · · · · · p
Figure 2: Preferences of voters wa and w{a,b} with respect to C.
Note that increasing the approval count of a voter wa ∈ WV so that p obtains an
additional point has cost (3k−5)+(2k2−5k+5)+1 = 2k2−2k+1. Since (k+1)(2k2−2k+1) =
2k3 − k+ 1 > B, at most k voters can be bribed in this way without exceeding the budget.
Note also that bribing k + 1 voters from WV in this manner would make p a winner at the
cost of 2k3 − k + 1 = B + 1, which shows that β(I) ≤ B + 1.
Since p’s score needs to be increased by at least k, we can conclude that t must bribe ex-
actly k voters from the set WV , while increasing p’s score by exactly k. Let ws1 , ws2 , . . . , wsk
denote these bribed voters. We are going to show that the vertex set S = {νs1 , . . . , νsk} is
a solution of the multicolored clique instance.
Observe that when voters ws1 , ws2 , . . . , wsk are bribed, each of the k(k − 1) candidates
in C∗ =
⋃k
i=1C(νsi) receives one additional point. Since each of these candidates has L
approvals in the original election (C, V ), and the final score of p in psh(C, V, t) is L, t must
bribe some additional voters to lower their approval count so that each candidate in C∗
loses at least one point. Bribing a voter in Vinit ∪WV to decrease the score of any candidate
in CV costs more than B. Thus, to prevent the candidates in C∗ from beating p, t must
bribe some voters in WE ; let W ∗E denote the set of these voters.
Bribing a voter w{a,b} ∈W ∗E may:
(i) decrease the score of exactly one candidate in CV at a cost of 3, or
(ii) decrease the score of exactly two candidates in CV at a cost of 4, or
(iii) decrease the score of ` candidates in CV for some ` ≥ 3 at a cost of 3(`− 2) + 4.
Thus, decreasing the score of any candidate in C∗ has a cost of at least 2 per candidate;
moreover, equality can only be achieved if case (ii) holds for each of the bribed voters. Hence,
in order to decrease the approval score by one for each of the k(k − 1) candidates in C∗,
the briber needs to spend at least 2k(k − 1). We have argued that the briber has to spend
k(2k2−2k+1) on bribing voters in WV . Thus, her remaining budget is B−k(2k2−2k+1) =
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2k(k − 1), i.e., t must bribe exactly (k2) voters from WE , lowering the approval counts of
each voter in W ∗E by exactly 4; moreover, both non-dummy candidates who lose points as
a result of this bribery should be members of C∗.
Now, fix some vertex νx ∈ S, and let i be the index for which νx ∈ V i. By the definition
of C∗ and S, we have C(νx) ⊆ C∗. Therefore, for each j with 1 ≤ j ≤ k, j 6= i, the
candidate cjx ∈ C∗ must be among the last four approved candidates of some voter in W ∗E .
By construction of WE , this voter must be w{x,y} for some y where {νx, νy} ∈ E and νy ∈ Vj .
As argued in the previous paragraph, this means that ciy ∈ C∗ and hence νy ∈ S. Thus, for
every vertex νx in the set S, we can conclude that each class Vj with νx 6∈ Vj contains a
vertex in S∩Vj that is adjacent to νx. As this holds for each νx ∈ S, it follows that S forms
a clique of size k in G.
For the converse direction, suppose that vertices νs1 , . . . , νsk form a clique of size k in
G. It can be easily verified that lowering the approval counts of each of the voters w{si,sj}
with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k by 4 and increasing the approval counts of each of the voters wsi with
1 ≤ i ≤ k by 2k2−2k+1 results in a successful bribery of cost 4(k2)+(2k2−2k+1)k = B.
In Theorem 11 we proved that, even for single-peaked preferences and unit costs func-
tions, SP-AV-Support Bribery does not admit an FPT algorithm with respect to pa-
rameter β unless FPT = W[1]. Naturally, this hardness result also holds for the smaller
parameter β′. In contrast, we will now describe an algorithm that is FPT with respect to
parameter β′ and for any fixed ε > 0 outputs an (1 + ε)-approximation for this variant of
Support Bribery.
Theorem 12. For any fixed ε > 0, SP-AV-support bribery for single-peaked preferences
can be (1 + ε)-approximated by an algorithm that is FPT with respect to β′, as long as
σi(k) ≥ 1 for each k and each i = 1, . . . , n.
Proof. Fix a positive constant ε. Let I = (C, V,Σ, p) be our input instance of SP-AV-
support bribery with parameter β′. Just as in the proof of Theorem 10, we can assume
that the parameter β′ is given as part of the input; otherwise, we can simply run our
algorithm with increasing values of the parameter starting from 1. Set n = |V |. For each
i = 1, . . . , n, we let vi and `i denote the i-th voter in V and her approval count. Suppose
that all voters’ preferences are single-peaked with respect to a linear order C. Let B be our
bribery budget.
Let t = (t1, . . . , tn) be some minimal minimum-cost bribery such that β
′ =
∑n
i=1 |ti|.
Also, let V + = {vi ∈ V | ti > 0} and V − = {vi ∈ V | ti < 0}.
Since t is a minimal successful bribery, each voter vi ∈ V + ranks p in position `i + ti.
Thus, given a voter vi who does not approve of p, we will refer to the act of increasing vi’s
approval count by rank(p, vi)− `i as buying vi. The price of vi is the cost of buying him.
Note that since the election is single-peaked, for any voter vi ∈ V it holds that the
set of candidates approved by vi is a contiguous interval of the order C. Hence, the set
of candidates that would receive an additional approval when vi is bought consists of two
disjoint contiguous intervals of C; one of them has p as an endpoint (and the other one
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might be empty). We write B(vi) and S(vi) to denote these two sets of candidates, where
B(vi) is the one containing p; we refer to B(vi) and S(vi) as the base and the shadow of vi.
Guessing expensive voters in V +. Our algorithm starts by guessing the set of voters V +1 ⊆
V + whose price is at least εB. Since the price of each voter is at least 1, we have |V +1 | ≤ 1/ε.
Therefore, the algorithm has to try at most nb1/εc possibilities; for constant ε, this quantity
is polynomial in the input size. (Note also that |V +1 | ≤ |V +| ≤ β′, so the number of
possibilities to be considered at this stage can be bounded as nmin{b1/εc,β′}).
Guessing structural properties of t. Next, the algorithm guesses the following information
about t:
1. the total score s∗ with which p wins in psh(C, V, t);
2. the size k of the set W = V + \ V +1 (we will refer to the voters in W as w1, . . . , wk);
3. the base B(wi) for each voter wi ∈W ;
4. the size |S(wi)| of the shadow for each voter wi ∈W .
Since we have 0 ≤ k ≤ β′, there are at most β′ + 1 possible values of k. There are also
at most 2β′ + 1 possible choices for s∗ and at most β′ + 1 possible choices for the size of
each shadow. The base of each voter wi ∈W is a set of candidates that is represented by a
contiguous interval of C of length at most β′ whose left or right endpoint is p. This yields
2β′ − 1 possible choices for each B(wi). Thus, the total number of possible choices in this
guessing step does not exceed (2β′ + 1)(β′ + 1)β′+1(2β′ − 1)β′ .
Color-coding step. To apply color-coding [1], we associate a color i with each voter wi ∈W .
Given a voter v who does not approve p, we say that color i is suitable for v if it holds that
B(v) = B(wi) and |S(v)| = |S(wi)|. The color-coding step of the algorithm assigns colors
to some of the voters in V as follows: for each voter v ∈ V \ V +1 that does not approve p,
it chooses uniformly between coloring v with one of the colors suitable for him and leaving
v uncolored. Recall that the algorithm does not know the voters w1, . . . , wk, but it has
already guessed their bases and the sizes of their shadows, which suffices to compute the
set of suitable colors for each voter.
We say that the coloring is successful for a voter wi ∈ W if wi is colored with his own
color i; it is successful for a voter v ∈ V − if it leaves him uncolored. A coloring is successful
if it is successful for all voters in W ∪V −. For each of the voters in W ∪V −, the probability
that our coloring is successful for him is at least 1/(k + 1), so with probability at least
(k + 1)−β′ the color-coding process results in a successful coloring. Note also that if k = β′
then V − = ∅, and we can simply color each voter with a suitable color (without leaving
voters uncolored) and obtain a successful coloring with probability at least β′−β′ . From now
on, we assume that we are given a successful coloring.
Guessing additional voters in V +. Observe that if two voters, v and v′, have the same base
and the same shadow, then buying either of these voters has exactly the same effect on
each candidate. Hence, when looking for an optimal bribery, we should choose among such
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voters based on their price. Based on this observation, for each color i, i = 1, . . . , k, we
will define a set Ri of relevant voters, using the following procedure. Let r = β
′2 + 1. We
start with Ri = ∅, consider the voters with color i in order of non-decreasing prices, and
place a voter v into Ri if and only if no other voter in Ri has the same shadow as v. We
stop when |Ri| = r or when we have considered all voters with color i. Let pi denote the
maximum price of a voter in Ri. By construction, we can assume without loss of generality
that wi ∈ Ri or the price of wi is at least pi (in which case |Ri| = r).
Now, our algorithm makes some further guesses. For each color i, i = 1, . . . , k, it guesses
whether wi ∈ Ri; if its guess is “yes”, it also guesses which voter in Ri is wi. For each
color such a guess can have at most r + 1 outcomes, so the algorithm has to try at most
(r + 1)k ≤ (β′2 + 1)β′ possibilities at this step. Let V +2 be the set of voters guessed at this
step. Set M = {i | wi /∈ Ri}; we refer to colors in M as missing colors. Note that for each
i ∈M we have |Ri| = r; this observation will prove useful in our analysis
Dynamic programming step. Next, the algorithm performs the following calculation for each
candidate c ∈ C \{p}. It computes the score that c would obtain if we were to buy all voters
in V +1 and V
+
2 . It then adds one extra point for each candidate in B(wi) for each missing
color i. We denote the resulting quantity by s∗(c). Observe that, if we were to buy all voters
in V +, then the score of c would be at least s∗(c). Let C∗ = {c ∈ C | s∗(c) > s∗}. Note that
bribery t buys all voters in V + and therefore it has to decrease the score of each candidate
c ∈ C∗ by at least s∗(c) − s∗ in order to prevent these candidates from beating p. Clearly,
t achieves this through decreasing the approval counts of the voters in V −.
Instead of trying to find the set V −, our algorithm simply computes a minimum-cost
bribery t∗ that decreases the score of each c ∈ C∗ by at least s∗(c)− s∗ while bribing only
uncolored votes. As we assume that we have a successful coloring, bribing each voter in V −
according to t constitutes a feasible solution to this problem, and therefore the cost Σ(t∗)
does not exceed the cost of changing the approval count by ti in each vote v
i ∈ V −.
The algorithm computes t∗ by dynamic programming. We fix an ordering on C∗ and
on the set of uncolored voters. Suppose we have U uncolored voters; clearly, U ≤ n. Let
m∗ = |C∗|. Then for j ∈ {1, . . . , U} and s1, . . . , sm∗ ∈ {0, . . . , β′}, we define f(j, s1, . . . , sm∗)
to be the minimum cost of a bribery that bribes a subset of the first j uncolored voters
and for each i = 1, . . . ,m∗ decreases the number of approvals of the i-th candidate in C∗
by at least si. We can compute f(j, s1, . . . , sm∗) given the values of f(j − 1, s′1, . . . , s′m∗)
for all s′1, . . . , s′m∗ ∈ {0, . . . , β′} in time O(|I|). As |C∗| ≤ β′, this means that all values
f(j, s1, . . . , s|C∗|) and the bribery t∗ itself can be computed in O(β′β
′ |I|2) time.
Greedy phase. In the last step, the algorithm iteratively constructs a set V +3 using the
following greedy procedure. We say that a voter is available if his shadow does not intersect
the shadow of any of the voters already in V +3 . Initially, the algorithm sets V
+
3 = ∅. It then
considers the missing colors one by one (in any order), and for each i ∈M it places any of
the available voters from Ri into V
+
3 . As a final step, the algorithm picks one extra available
vote, denoted by vextra , from R|M |. At the end of this procedure, the set V +3 contains exactly
one vote from Ri for each missing color i, i 6= |M |, and exactly two votes from R|M |, and
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has the property that the shadows of the voters in V +3 are pairwise disjoint. We will now
explain why it is possible to pick |M |+ 1 voters in this manner.
Briefly, the feasibility of our greedy procedure is implied by our choice of r. In more
detail, observe that, whenever the algorithm has to pick the next voter to add to V +3 , the
total size of the shadows of the voters already in V +3 does not exceed β
′; this is because
each voter in Ri has the same shadow size as wi, and, by definition, we have
∑k
i=1 |S(wi)| ≤
β′. Now, as the shadow of each voter in Ri is a contiguous interval of length |S(wi)| in
the order C, there can be at most |S(wi)| voters in Ri whose shadows contain a certain
candidate. Thus there can be at most β′|S(wi)| ≤ β′2 voters whose shadows contain any
of the candidates in
⋃
v∈V +3 S(v) and who are, hence, not available. Since |Ri| = r for each
i ∈M , this means that for r = β′2 + 1 the algorithm can always choose an available voter.
We are now ready to define the output tout of the algorithm: this is the bribery obtained
by buying each voter in V +1 ∪ V +2 ∪ V +3 , and then applying the bribery t∗. The running
time of this algorithm is O(β′O(β′)nb1/εc|I|2). We will now prove that it outputs a successful
bribery of cost at most (1 + ε)B with probability at least β′−β′ .
To see that the cost of tout does not exceed (1 + ε)B, observe first that in the branch
of the algorithm that performs all the guesses correctly, the voters in V +1 ∪ V +2 are exactly
the voters in V + \ {wi | i ∈ M}. These voters are bought by t, and therefore their price
is present in the cost of t as well. Now, consider a voter v ∈ V +3 . If his color is i, then his
price does not exceed that of wi. Hence, the total price of the voters in V
+
3 \ {vextra} does
not exceed the price of the voters {wi | i ∈M}, which is also included in the cost of t. The
cost of the bribery t∗, which only decreases approval counts, is no greater than the amount
spent by t on bribing the voters in V −. Thus, we can conclude that the cost of tout is at
most the cost of t plus the price of vextra . However, as w|M | ∈ V + \ V +1 , we know that the
price of w|M |—and hence the price of vextra—is less than εB. This implies that the cost of
tout is at most (1 + ε)B.
To complete the proof, we need to show that tout succeeds in making p a winner. Observe
that, while the bribery t increases p’s score by |V +|, the bribery tout increases p’s score
by |V +| + 1 because of the vote vextra . This means that the total approval score of p in
psh(C, V, tout) is s
∗ + 1.
Let us fix a candidate c ∈ C \ {p}. First, assume that c is not contained in the shadow
of any of the voters in V +3 . Then, by our definition of s
∗(c), after we buy the voters in
V +1 ∪ V +2 ∪ V +3 , the score of c is exactly s∗(c). Therefore, once we apply t∗, the final score
of c in psh(C, V, tout) is at most s
∗. Now, assume that c is contained in the shadow of some
voter in V +3 . Since the shadows of the voters in V
+
3 are pairwise disjoint, there is exactly
one voter in V +3 whose shadow contains c. This means that, after we buy the voters in
V +1 ∪ V +2 ∪ V +3 , the score of candidate c is exactly s∗(c) + 1, which implies that c’s final
score in psh(C, V, tout) is at most s
∗ + 1. Hence, the score of every candidate c ∈ C \ {p} in
psh(C, V, tout) is at most s
∗ + 1. It follows that tout indeed makes p a winner.
To derandomize the algorithm, we can use standard techniques relying on families of
perfect hash functions, see [1]; note that randomization only occurs at the color-coding
step.
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6 Conclusions and Future Work
Our results show that shift bribery tends to be computationally easier than support bribery.
However, in general, the power of these campaign management strategies is incomparable:
one can construct examples of, e.g., Fallback elections where it is impossible to make some-
one a winner within a finite budget by shift bribery, but it is possible to do so by support
bribery, or vice versa. Thus, both shift bribery and support bribery deserve to be studied
in more detail.
An important contribution of this paper is the study of the parameterized version of
support bribery, where the parameter is the total change in the approval counts. This nat-
ural parameterization leads to FPT algorithms for support bribery under two variants of
the Fallback rule, as well as for SP-AV, for a large class of bribery cost functions. Also, we
presented an approximation algorithm for the case of single-peaked preferences and unit
costs that runs in FPT time with this parameterization. Finding other tractable parame-
terizations, or more generally, identifying further tractable cases (either in the classical, or
in the parameterized sense) is an interesting direction for future research. The reader may
wonder if it would make sense to study parameterized complexity of shift bribery. While
for the voting rules considered in this paper shift bribery is polynomial-time solvable, for
other rules it often is NP-complete [17]. Very recently, Bredereck et al. [9] gave a detailed
parameterized study of shift bribery for several such voting rules.
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A Destructive Support Bribery
In this appendix, we briefly discuss destructive support bribery. In the destructive variant
of the problem, the goal is not to ensure a preferred candidate’s victory, but to prevent
a despised candidate from winning. In contrast to our hardness results for constructive
support bribery, we can show that destructive support bribery is easy for SP-AV, simplified
Fallback voting, and Fallback voting.
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Theorem 13. destructive support bribery is in P for each of SP-AV, simplified
Fallback voting, and Fallback voting.
Proof. For of each of SP-AV, simplified Fallback voting, and Fallback voting, we use the
same strategy and compute certain functions defined below using dynamic programming.
Let E = (C, V ) be an election, where C = {d, c1, . . . , cm−1} and V = (v1, . . . , vn) is a
collection of voters (each voter vi has preference order i and approval count `i). We are
also given support bribery cost functions Σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) for all voters. The outline of our
algorithm, same for each of our voting rules, is as follows:
1. For each candidate c ∈ C \ {d} compute the lowest cost of ensuring that c prevents d
from being a winner.
2. Output the minimum of the costs computed in the previous step.
Naturally, the exact meaning of “c prevents d from being a winner” is different for each of
our voting rules. For SP-AV it means that (a) c has more approvals in total than d has. For
simplified Fallback voting it means that either (a′) c has more approvals in total than d and
d does not win in any round, or (b) c wins in some round t and d does not win in round
t. In case of Fallback voting, we need either (a′) or (b′) c wins in some round t, d does not
win in round t− 1, and c has more t-approval points than d.
Let us fix a candidate c ∈ C \ {d}. To describe algorithms computing a lowest-cost
support bribery for each of the above conditions, for each k, i, j in {0, . . . , n} and for each t
in {1, . . . ,m} we define ft(k, i, j) to be the cost of a minimum-cost support bribery ensuring
that exactly i voters in Vk = {v1, . . . , vk} approve c and rank her in top t positions and
exactly j voters in Vk approve d and rank her in top t positions. It is easy to verify that
for each t and each k, i, j in this range we can easily compute ft(k, i, j) in polynomial time
using standard dynamic programming techniques.
Now, it is easy to see that the lowest cost of ensuring that c has more approvals than d
(condition (a)) is exactly min{fm(n, i, j) | i > j}. Similarly, the minimum cost of ensuring
that condition (a′) holds is min{fm(n, i, j) | i > j, j <
⌊
n
2
⌋
+ 1}. The lowest cost of ensuring
that either c wins in an earlier round than d or c wins in some round but d does not
(condition (b)) is
min
{
ft(n, i, j) | i ≥
⌊n
2
⌋
+ 1, j <
⌊n
2
⌋
+ 1, 1 ≤ t ≤ m
}
.
To deal with the case of classic Fallback voting and compute the lowest cost of ensuring
condition (b′), we have to modify our family of functions ft a little. For each k, i, j, r
in {0, . . . , n} and each t in {1, . . . ,m}, let f ′t(k, i, j, r) be the cost of a lowest-cost support
bribery ensuring that exactly i voters in Vk = {v1, . . . , vk} approve c and rank her in top
t positions, exactly j voters in Vk approve d and rank her in top t positions, and exactly
r voters in Vk approve d and rank her in top t − 1 positions. Clearly, each function f ′t is
computable in polynomial time using standard dynamic programming techniques. Using
these functions, we can compute the lowest cost of making c win in some round where she
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has more approvals than d does, while also making sure that d does not win in the previous
round (condition (b′)):
min
{
f ′t(n, i, j, r) | i ≥
⌊n
2
⌋
+ 1, i > j, r <
⌊n
2
⌋
+ 1, 1 ≤ t ≤ m
}
.
These observations show that destructive support bribery is in P for each of SP-AV, sim-
plified Fallback voting, and Fallback voting.
Not much is known about destructive shift bribery, where the briber can ask the voters
to demote the despised candidate d in order to prevent her from winning the elections; we
propose algorithmic analysis of this form of bribery as a topic for future work. Additional
motivation for the study of destructive shift bribery is provided by recent work that suggests
some very interesting applications of this concept [34, 39].
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